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Abstract 
There is inconclusive evidence regarding the economic value of certification in the 
context of IPOs in developed markets.  Using a natural experiment of regulator mandated 
IPO grading requirement, we examine the effects of third-party certification in the Indian 
IPO market. This unique setting allows us to address the broader issue of whether 
certification is more valuable in emerging markets with institutional voids.  We document 
mixed evidence regarding the impact of IPO grading exercise on the information 
environment. Underpricing is unaffected by the grading process.  However, stock price 
informativeness as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility increases significantly due to IPO 
grading process. Using a pseudo grading process we find that the grades are not 
mechanically derivable from publicly available information. Overall, our evidence is 
consistent with the view that credit rating agencies in emerging markets can potentially 
supply useful information of relevance to both retail and institutional investors.        
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1.0 Introduction 
Despite two decades of research, empirical evidence regarding the impact of certification 
on pricing in the U.S. market is contradictory.  While some researchers posit a beneficial 
impact of certification, others find the exactly opposite effect.1  But the IPO market in 
U.S. is dominated by institutions and therefore the value of certification is relatively less 
important.  This leads us to the question as to when certification will be valuable. Khanna 
and Palepu (2000) point out that emerging markets such as India have institutional voids 
in their capital markets.  So the natural question is whether certification would be a 
valuable device in Indian IPO markets.  We deal with this important issue utilizing the 
natural experiment of regulatory change in the Indian IPO market.  Effective from May 1, 
2007, the Indian regulator mandated ‘grading’ of IPOs by credit rating agencies.  We use 
this unique setting to address the broader issue of whether certification is useful in 
markets with institutional voids.   
 We motivate the paper by drawing upon several distinguishing factors that 
differentiate Indian capital markets from the advanced markets of the west.  First, there 
are substantial institutional voids in Indian capital markets.  As a consequence, investors 
are not as well protected as compared to their counterparts in developed markets.  
Second, the IPO market is characterized by considerable participation by retail investors 
many of whom are financially illiterate.  Third, most issues are oversubscribed several 
times over and therefore lead managers need to ration the allocation of shares.   Finally, 
in the long-run the secondary market liquidity of IPOs reduces substantially leaving 
                                                 
1While Lee and Wahal (2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2002) find a positive effect of certification due to 
venture capitalist affiliation and underwriter reputation, Barry et. al. (1990) and Carter, dark, and Singh 
(1997) document the exactly opposite effect.  
 
 
2
investors without an exit option.  Summing up, the current state of IPO market does not 
inspire investor confidence.  In this context, it is relevant to examine whether certification 
of IPOs can improve the market quality in India.  
 While rating of debt is a common practice, rating of equity (IPO) issues is not 
prevalent elsewhere.  The apparent intent of this new regulation is to protect retail 
investors.  Ostensibly, the retail investors will now have access to information regarding 
the quality of the issue before they commit their funds.  This move has raised 
controversies in the Indian financial press.  While proponents argue that the move will 
increase the information availability and possibly eliminate low quality issues.  
Opponents posit that the move imposes additional costs and delays especially on small 
firms.  Therefore, an empirical examination of the relevance of IPO grading is warranted.  
 The critical issues that can be potentially examined in this setting are as follows: 
• Did the information environment improve in the post-grading period? 
• Did low quality IPOs withdraw from the market? 
• Were IPOs better priced in the post-grading period? 
• Did the variability in subscription levels increase in the post-grading period? 
 We take a two-pronged approach to empirically examine the effect of IPO grading 
on Indian capital markets.  First, we examine whether IPO grading has improved the 
information environment obtaining in the Indian markets.  Second, we examine whether 
IPO grades have an economic impact (informational value).  The regulator in imposing 
this new requirement presumes the absence of adequate of information available to retail 
investors regarding forthcoming IPO issues.  We question this presumption.  We argue 
that issue prospectuses are now freely (electronically) available to potential investors.  
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Furthermore, the financial press publishes recommendations regarding the IPOs.  Thus 
the central issue is whether grades provided by rating agencies are more credible as 
compared to those provided by others.  A brief preview of our results is presented below. 
 The evidence regarding the impact of IPO grading on the information 
environment is mixed.  The IPO certification process did not result in lower underpricing 
as expected.  IPO grading is associated with an improvement in the informativeness of 
stock prices as depicted by idiosyncratic volatility.  In general, IPOs were priced at a 
higher level during the post-grading period.       
 The evidence with respect to economic impact of IPO grades is likewise mixed.  
Actual IPO grades have no influence on the extent of underpricing.  IPO grades 
significantly positively subscription levels of both retail and institutional investors.  An 
interesting finding from our study is that the process of grading improves the 
informativeness of stock prices but actual grades bear no relationship to stock price 
informativeness.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we describe the 
background regarding the IPO grading process in India and draw out the testable 
implications.  In section 3, we explain our data collection procedure and describe our 
sample characteristics.  Section 4 contains our empirical results regarding the impact of 
IPO grading process on the information environment.  Section 5 deals with the economic 
impact of the actual IPO grades.  Section 6 describes our attempt to see if investors are in 
a position to infer IPO grades from publicly available information.  The final section 
contains our conclusions.  
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2.0 Background and Testable Implications  
2.1 Regulatory Framework  
In March 2007 the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the securities market 
regulator in India, ruled that all initial public offerings (IPO) entering the capital market 
must get a compulsory grading from one of the credit rating agencies2.  The move was 
aimed at allowing only bona fide companies to raise capital and prevent fly-by-night 
operators from accessing the capital market.  Mandatory IPO grading was to be effective 
from May 1, 2007.  
IPO grade is the rating assigned by a Credit Rating Agency (CRA) registered with 
SEBI, to the IPO of equity shares or any other security which may be converted into or 
exchanged with equity shares at a later date.  The grade represents a relative assessment 
of the fundamentals of that issue in relation to the other listed equity securities in India.  
Such grading is generally assigned on a five-point point scale with a higher score 
indicating stronger fundamentals and vice versa as below. 
IPO grade 1: Poor fundamentals 
IPO grade 2: Below-average fundamentals 
IPO grade 3: Average fundamentals 
IPO grade 4: Above-average fundamentals 
IPO grade 5: Strong fundamentals 
 
IPO grading can be done either before filing the draft offer documents with SEBI 
or thereafter. However, the Prospectus/Red Herring Prospectus, as the case may be, must 
contain the grade/s given to the IPO by all CRAs approached by the company for grading 
such IPO.  Interestingly, IPO grades were not assessed taking into account the price at 
which the IPO was to be issued.  
                                                 
2 There are four credit rating agencies in India: CRISIL, CARE, ICRA and Fitch.   
 
 
 
5
Under the regulation, companies rather than investor-protection fund would bear 
the costs of the grading process.  The cost of grading each issue is approximately Rs 
500,000 and takes around 3-4 weeks.  Grading of IPOs was introduced earlier as an 
optional measure by SEBI as part of its initiatives aimed at protecting investors’ interests.  
In March 2007 about 15 companies had completed grading with three major credit rating 
agencies- ICRA, CRISIL and CARE3.  Those that did, interestingly, received a lukewarm 
response on the exchanges. 
According to CRISIL, one of the top credit rating agencies in India, IPO grading 
represents an independent relative assessment of fundamentals of the equity based on the 
following:  
a. Business Prospects. This comprises  
i. Industry prospects  
ii. Company prospects - the alignment between industry opportunities, the 
company's strategy and its capabilities. 
b. Financial Prospects - This includes a rigorous assessment of accounting
quality using advanced tools devised by CRISIL Research  
c. Management quality - An assessment of the ability of the management to
handle uncertainty in terms of capitalizing on future business opportunity and 
mitigating the impact of contingencies 
d. Corporate governance - An evaluation of the company's governance
architecture to determine if it is structured such that the risks and rewards of
business are equally available to all shareholders in keeping with the basic 
tenets of a joint-stock company. 
 
2.2 Pros and Cons of IPO Grading4 
Although the move by the Indian regulator to mandate IPO grading is driven by the 
overarching necessity to provide small investors with protection, it has not met with 
widespread support from the market participants and the financial press.  We summarize 
below the arguments advanced by both proponents and detractors of the move. 
                                                 
3 Our sample starts from January 1, 2006 and includes the period when firms could voluntarily get their 
issues graded.  
4 We heavily draw upon the work of Jain and Sharma (2008) in developing the arguments in this subsection.  
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 The proponents argue that IPO grading is beneficial due to the following reasons: 
reduction of information asymmetry, decrease of information overload, independent 
expert appraisal of firm fundamentals, provision of meaningful information to 
support investment decision, and deterrence of low quality issues.  We expand on 
these factors below: 
Reduction of Information Asymmetry: Most firms that make IPOs are not well-known.  
Thus there exists considerable information asymmetry regarding the operations, viability 
and future prospects of such firms.  Through certification via the IPO grading process, 
information asymmetry is sought to be reduced.  It is expected that other things being 
equal, this reduction in information asymmetry will be accompanied by a reduction in 
risk and a consequent reduction in the required rate of return.  At the core of this 
approach, is the implicit assumption that more information is always preferred to less 
information.   
Decrease of Information Overload: In the context of the Indian IPO market, information 
disclosures have increased substantially such that investors may now face a deluge of 
information.  This information overload may have the adverse effect of creating 
difficulties for rationally processing huge amounts of data in order to arrive at the 
investment decision.  In this environment, by certifying the quality of the issue, the credit 
rating agencies are aiding the investor by reducing the burden of information overload.   
Independent Expert Appraisal of Fundamentals: Another possible benefit of the IPO 
grading exercise is the appraisal of fundamentals of the issuing firm.  Although, 
investment bankers are charged with the responsibility of conducting due diligence to 
certify the veracity of financial and other critical information provided in the issue 
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prospectus, there exists the issue of conflict of interest.  Thus it is argued that investors 
would be better served by an independent agency that evaluates the fundamentals of the 
firm.    
Provision of Meaningful Information: In mandating IPO grading, the approach of SEBI 
seems to have shifted from information disclosure to meaningful information disclosure.  
The IPO grading exercise essentially entrusts the credit rating agencies with the task of 
deriving significant information from a host of subjective factors deemed essential for 
investment decision.  Thus the credit rating agencies are expected to perform the role of 
information processing intermediaries.  Given the lack of financial literacy of the average 
Indian investor, IPO grading could potentially be an useful exercise.   
Deterrence of low quality issues: Firms without track record or credibility, when they try 
to access the market for finance, will now face an additional layer of scrutiny.  Thus the 
lowest quality of issuers might find the going tough and withdraw from the IPO market.  
Thus the IPO investors, composed largely of retail investors are precluded from potential 
investments in low quality, high risk firms.  Thus the weeding out of unviable securities 
is another potential fallout of the IPO grading regulation.  
 The detractors of the move to grade IPOs raise objections that may be categorized 
into three groups: viability of the grading process, inherent bias against SMEs, and 
credibility of rating agencies.  We expand on these arguments below. 
Viability of the grading process: The opponents of the IPO grading process argue that 
the concept of rating as applied to debt instruments cannot be directly imported to equity 
issues.  While debt issues are typically rated in terms of downside risk, any rating of 
equity necessitates an assessment of the upside potential to the investor.  Thus the 
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principal thrust here is the conceptual objection to the fundamental process of rating 
equity.  Another objection to the rating proposal stems from the inherent subjectivity.  
Since the specific methodologies employed by different rating agencies could be different, 
it would be difficult if not impossible to assign grades in an objective manner. 
Furthermore, the grading process does not take into account the price at which the issue is 
to be made.  This renders the entire process futile since price is the most significant factor 
affecting the viability of a potential investment.  For instance, an issue with a low grade 
may turn out to be an attractive investment if offered at a low price.  Finally, 
encapsulation of all relevant information into a single numerical grade is too simplistic to 
be of use to investors.  
Inherent bias against SMEs: The mandatory grading process entails an additional fixed 
compliance cost that includes grading fees and costs of disclosure in addition to the 
underwriting and marketing fee payable to investment bankers.  These costs are likely to 
be a higher percentage of issue proceeds for small and medium sized enterprises.  
Furthermore, small firms as compared to large firms are most likely seen to highly risky 
and this inherent bias is likely to work against them.  At the extreme, the grading 
stipulation is likely to wipe out the IPO exit option for promising SMEs.  The unviability 
of the exit option is likely to render venture capital investments in small high enterprises 
unattractive with deeper repercussions for capital formation and economic growth.5     
Credibility of rating agencies: The move to mandate IPO grading, presupposes the 
credibility of rating agencies.  This presumption is questionable on three counts.  First, 
                                                 
5 According to Reserve Bank of India reports (several issues) SMEs contribute up to 40% of industrial 
production in India.  
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the oligopolistic structure of rating agencies raises serious concerns of credibility. 6  
Second, since rating agencies offer ancillary services, there exists considerable scope for 
abuse in terms of compromising grading obligations for selling these services.  Third, the 
lack of responsibility and concomitant liability raises a serious question regarding the 
credibility of the exercise.  Since rating agencies are prone to using the standard 
disclaimers thus precluding potential legal liability, the independence and fairness 
arguments are considerably weakened. 
2.3 Testable Implications 
Based on the arguments advanced in the previous subsection, we can draw a number of 
testable implications.  
First, since the underlying premise behind the IPO grading is the provision of useful 
information to the naïve investor, a basic question of interest to us is whether the 
information environment improved in the post-grading period.  If it did, then we would 
expect to see a lower level of underpricing in the post-grading period.  
A second consequence of the improved information environment for Indian IPOs is 
better pricing.  Since one of the reasons behind the observed underpricing is information 
asymmetry, any episode that results in an attenuation of the existing information 
asymmetry should result in higher issue prices.  
A third possible effect of the IPO grading exercise is the potential withdrawal of low 
quality issues from the market.  However, this issue is likely to be difficult to address due 
to two reasons.  First, an unambiguous assessment of quality is fraught with conceptual 
and measurement problems.  Second, a firm’s internal deliberations regarding making an 
IPO and subsequent withdrawal taking into account the IPO grading requirement are 
                                                 
6 The Enron debacle comes to one’s mind in this context.  
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potentially unobservable.  Hence, we do not pursue this line of enquiry further in this 
paper.  
Fourth, as a consequence of the IPO grading exercise, firms are likely to disseminate 
more information to CRAs and the public.  This is because high quality firms have 
incentives to portray themselves in better light and they expect to achieve that by 
augmenting the quantity and quality of information.  The enhancement in the information 
environment following IPO grading is likely to result in an increase in the 
informativeness of stock prices. 
Finally, if IPO grades have information content, then investors will use them to guide 
their decision to subscribe to a given issue.  This event will therefore increase the 
variability of subscription levels in the post-grading period especially for retail investors.  
 
3.0 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample includes all Indian IPOs that were issued from January 1, 2006 to December 
31, 2008. We obtain our data from four different sources.  SDC Platinum New Issues data 
base was our source for basic issue characteristics.  The website of the regulator was 
utilized as the source of issue prospectuses.  Bloomberg database was our source for 
stock prices and trading volume.  Finally, we accessed the websites of the credit rating 
agencies to obtain the IPO grades.  
 Our overall sample is composed of 177 issues out of 54 were graded.  Two of the 
issues were graded by two agencies.  In table 1, we show the distribution of our sample of 
graded IPOs across the five grades.  The sample is also broke down by the four rating 
agencies.  Twenty four out of fifty six, i.e. 43% of the graded issues received a grade of 3 
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signifying average fundamentals.  Ten out of fifty six issues obtained a grade of 4 
indicating above average fundamentals.  Fourteen issues (25%) were graded 2 denoting 
below average fundamentals.  14% of the issues received a grade of 1 indicating poor 
fundamentals.  CARE, CRISIL, and ICRA seem to have roughly equal share of the 
grading business. Fitch seems to be a minor player.  The above distribution also indicates 
that the median and mode grade received by firms equal 3.  Thus it is likely that an 
investor may attribute an average grade of 3 for ungraded issues.  We notice that a 
substantial number of issues even in the post-May 1, 2007 period are not graded.7  
 In table 2, we show descriptive statistics regarding offer, firm and governance 
characteristics of our entire sample and the two subsamples based on whether the issue 
was graded or not.  Most of the characteristics are similar for the graded and ungraded 
subsamples with one notable exception.  The net proceeds of graded firms are 
significantly lower than that of ungraded firms.  This finding implies that firms making 
smaller issues have incentives to signal their quality by seeking grading.  
 In table 3, we compare key IPO-related variables of firms during the pre- and 
post- grading periods.  IPOs listed before May 1, 2007 are considered pre-grading period 
and those issued after that date belong to the post-grading period.  The results indicate 
that the initial listing returns on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) increase in the post-
grading period and is statistically significant at the 10% level 8 .  The level of 
oversubscription is also higher in the post-grading period and is statistically significant at 
the 10% level.  Multiples such as P/S and P/B increase substantially in the post-grading 
                                                 
7 Our conversations with some of the issue managers reveal that the ungraded firms received approval from 
SEBI prior to  May 1, 2007.  
8 We show results using prices from both the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange since 
both exchanges are active markets for trading the issues.  
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period.  This finding indicates better pricing power for IPOs, especially those that have 
valuable growth options.  We find that idiosyncratic volatility increases significantly in 
the post-grading period providing early evidence regarding the increase in 
informativeness of stock prices.9  
 One of the expected outcomes of the grading process is to align the retail 
investors’ demand for issues with the fundamentals of the issuing firm.  If retail investors 
become more discerning as a result of the grading process, then the variability in the 
subscription levels should increase.  In fact, this is exactly what we observe.  The 
standard deviation of number of retail applications per issue increases significantly in the 
post-grading period.  Furthermore, the variability in institutional and retail subscription 
levels both increase in the post-grading period. 
 
4.0 IPO Grading and the Information Environment 
In this section, we empirically examine the issue of whether IPO grading improved the 
information environment for newly issues equity securities in the Indian stock markets.  
In the next section, we study the economic impact of actual IPO grades.  
  We study three variables of interest – underpricing, idiosyncratic volatility and 
subscription level.  Our results using underpricing as the dependent variable are shown in 
table 4, models 1-4.  Underpricing is measured by the initial listing return measured from 
offer-to-close using stock prices from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).  We use a 
multivariate regression framework with controls for issue, firm, and governance 
characteristics.  The key result from these regressions is that the grading dummy, which 
                                                 
9 We explore this issue in further detail in the next section.  
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takes the value of one for graded IPOs and zero for others, is not statistically significant.  
This finding shows that IPO grading does not result in a decrease in underpricing.   
Issues with higher offer prices experience lower listing returns.  This finding is 
consistent with the view that offer price acts as a quality proxy.  Higher quality issues are 
less underpriced, ceteris paribus.  Issue size also has a negative coefficient indicating that 
large issues are less underpriced consistent with the belief that size is a proxy for quality.  
Neither firm characteristics nor governance features have any impact on the level of 
underpricing.  Subscription level has a positive and highly significant impact on 
underpricing.  Subscription level is a surrogate for latent demand and as such this finding 
indicates that issues which elicit greater demand from investors earn higher initial 
returns.   
We further examine the impact of IPO grading on information environment by 
using idiosyncratic volatility as the dependent variable in a multivariate setting.  Our 
choice of   idiosyncratic volatility is based on recent empirical work by researchers such 
as Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004).  If grading improves informativeness, then we 
should expect graded firms to have higher idiosyncratic volatility other things being 
equal.  We control for a set of variables reflecting issue, firm, and governance features as 
before.  
Our results are reported in table 5 (models 1-4).  We find that the grading dummy 
is statistically significant and positively impacts idiosyncratic volatility.  In addition, 
underpricing and offer price have positive significant effects on idiosyncratic volatility.  
We construe this finding as support for the view that IPO grading improves the 
information environment of the Indian market.  
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Another aspect of informativeness is the level of subscription by retail and 
institutional investors.  A key characteristic of the Indian IPO market is the extensive 
participation by retail investors.  Often, issues are heavily oversubscribed and market 
observers have attributed excess demand to retail investor overreaction.  If the IPO 
grading exercise results in improving the informativeness of India’s primary markets, 
then we expect excess demand to be curbed for graded issues as compared to ungraded 
issues.    
In table 6, we show empirical results using retail and institutional subscription 
levels as dependent variables.  In panel A, we report results of retail subscription.  We 
only find weak evidence (statistical significance at 10%) that grading dummy is 
associated with a decrease in retail subscription levels.  This result is not robust to 
inclusion of control variables.  Offer price enters with a negative coefficient indicating 
that high offer price acts as deterrent for retail investors.  Total assets have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on retail subscription.  This finding indicates that investors 
favour IPOs of large firms ceteris paribus.  
In Panel B, of table 6, we report multivariate regression results of institutional 
subscription levels.  The grading dummy has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient indicating that institutional subscription decreases for graded IPOs other 
things being equal.  This finding denotes that the informational environment of 
institutional investors improves due to the grading exercise.  
Summing up, we find mixed evidence regarding the impact of IPO certification 
on the information environment.  The IPO grading process did not reduce underpricing as 
 
 
15
expected. IPO grading is associated with an improvement in the informativeness of stock 
prices as measured by idiosyncratic volatility.   
 
5.0 Economic Impact of Actual IPO Grades  
In this section, we examine whether the grades assigned by the credit rating 
agencies have information content.  We would deem the grades to have information 
content if grades have an economic impact.  We gauge economic impact by observing 
underpricing, idiosyncratic volatility, and subscription levels.  Ostensibly, investors have 
access to other sources besides IPO grades assigned by credit rating agencies.  So for IPO 
grades to have an economic impact, they should have greater credibility in the perception 
of investors.  
Models 5, 6, and 7 in tables 4, 5, and 6 contain our test results.  In models 5 and 6 
we include both graded and ungraded firms.  In model 5, ungraded firms are assigned the 
grade of one, the lowest possible grade.  In model 6, we assign a grade of three to 
ungraded firms.  This assignment implicitly assumes that investors regard the typical 
ungraded issue to be of average quality.  Finally in model 7, we use only graded firms in 
the estimations.   
We use the variable ‘Analyst Recommend’ which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the financial press recommends subscription of the issue and zero 
otherwise.10  The ‘Analyst Recommend’ variable captures the impact of an alternate 
credible source of rating for the issue.  As such, it allows us to estimate the marginal 
effect of the grade given out by the credit rating agencies.  Empirical estimates of 
                                                 
10 We utilize the recommendations of IPOs published by Businessline, a business publication widely 
followed by investors.  
 
 
16
multivariate regression models of underpricing, contained in table 4, show that Analyst 
Recommend has a positive and statistically significant effect on underpricing.  
Interestingly, Analyst Recommend is not statistically significant in model 7, when we use 
only graded issues.  But the grade variable is also not significant.  The results indicate 
that grades do not influence the underpricing of issues.   
Empirical tests using idiosyncratic volatility as the dependent variable show that 
IPO grades do not have a reliable effect.  Thus while the process of grading improves the 
information environment for Indian IPOs, the actual grades have no relationship to the 
informativeness of stock prices as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility.  
Finally, we examine the impact of actual grades on retail and institutional 
subscription levels.  Panel A of Table 6 contains the empirical results using retail 
subscription as the dependent variable.  IPO grade positively influences retail 
subscription levels (models 6 and 7) and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  In 
panel B of table 6 we report results using institutional subscription as the dependent 
variable.  Interestingly, IPO grade also significantly positively influences institutional 
subscription.  Taken together, these results imply that both retail and institutional 
investors pay attention to the grades released by credit rating agencies.  They do seem to 
have credibility in that they affect both the retail and institutional demand for issues.   
The results from this section provide mixed evidence regarding the economic 
impact of IPO grades.  This leads us to the natural question as to whether investors can 
form their own impressions using issue details provided in the prospectus and other 
publicly available information.  We address this important issue in the following section.    
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6.0 Can Investors’ Infer the Grades from Publicly Available Information?  
In this section, we examine whether investors can infer the quality of an issue by using 
publicly available information.  We perform a pseudo grading exercise taking into 
account financial information, firm characteristics, and governance/certification features 
pertaining to the issue.   
In table 7 panel A, we display some of the key variables categorized on the basis 
of actual grades obtained by the firms.  We notice that most of the characteristics do not 
change monotonically as we move from lower to higher grades. The exceptions are age 
and post-IPO percentage shareholdings of promoters. 
We score each issue on the basis of financials, credibility, and 
governance/certification.  For financials, we consider EPS and D/E11.  For credibility, we 
include age and total assets.  Governance/ certification is indicated by percentage of 
independent directors, group affiliation, and post-IPO percentage shareholdings of 
promoters.  Each issue is scored on each characteristic based on whether it is above or 
below the median for the overall sample.  The scoring is reversed for D/E since higher 
values of this variable denote lower quality.  We aggregate scores based on 
characteristics to first obtain financial, credibility, and governance/certification sub-
scores.  We then equally weight sub-scores to obtain an overall score for each issue.  
Based on the scoring scheme, issue scores will range from 0 to 3.  We add one to the 
overall score to make it comparable to the scoring scheme followed by credit rating 
agencies.12  We label these as pseudo grades.             
                                                 
11 We did not consider multiples since the rating agencies did not consider issue price is assigning the 
grades.  Furthermore, firms may be determining the issue price subsequent to obtaining the grades from the 
rating agencies.  
12 Since none of the issues received a grade of five, we essentially have a 4 point scale.  
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In order to ascertain the efficacy of the pseudo grading process, we display the 
4x4 matrix of actual versus pseudo grades.  Overall, we find that 24 out of 54 issues are 
mis-classified amounting to an error percentage of 44%.  We tried several experiments 
changing the variables and the weightings.  These efforts did not result in an 
improvement in classification accuracy of pseudo-grades.  
Summing up, we conclude that there is no quick substitute to grades given out by 
credit rating agencies.  Evidently, rating agencies are using other information besides the 
information provided by issuing firms in determining the grades.  The non-monotonic 
changes in key characteristics across the different grades indicate that a mechanical 
scoring scheme cannot replicate the grading process of the rating agencies.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
Despite the plethora of research on the U.S. IPO market, there is inconclusive evidence 
regarding the economic effect of certification.  Using a natural experiment of regulator 
mandated IPO grading requirement, we examine the role of third-party certification in the 
Indian IPO market.  This unique setting lets us address the broader issue of whether 
certification is more valuable in emerging markets with institutional voids.  Our findings 
are expected to be useful to regulators and policy makers with similar shortcomings. 
 We find mixed evidence regarding the impact of IPO grading exercise on the 
information environment and the economic effects of actual grades.  Underpricing is 
unaffected by the grading process.  A key result of our paper is that stock price 
informativeness as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility increases significantly due to IPO 
grading.  However, the actual grades do not have a relationship with stock price 
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informativeness.  We also document the finding that the grades are not mechanically 
derived from publicly available information.  Our evidence is consistent with the view 
that credit rating agencies are information processing intermediaries that can potentially 
supply useful information of relevance to both retail and institutional investors in an 
emerging market setting.        
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Table 1 Grading Distribution 
This table presents the number of IPO firms graded by four credit rating agencies 
registered with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).  Four registered IPO 
grading agencies are CARE, CRISIL, ICRA, and FITCH.  The grading is assigned on a 
five-point scale ranging from 1 to 5.  IPOs graded 1 are poor fundamentals.  IPOs 
graded 2 are below average fundamentals.  IPOs graded 3 are average fundamentals.  
IPOs graded 4 are above average fundamentals.  IPOs graded 5 are strong 
fundamentals.  The IPO grading mandatory started from 2007, May 1.  Our sample 
consists of 177 IPO firms and 54 IPOs are graded from 2006 to 2008.*  
 
 Grading Scale  
Grading Agency 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
CARE 2 6 9 4 0 21 
CRISIL 4 2 6 4 0 16 
ICRA 2 6 7 1 0 16 
FITCH 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Total 8 14 24 10 0 56 
* Two IPOs in our sample are graded by two agencies. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the offer, firm and corporate governance characteristics in Panel A, B and C, respectively.  The IPO sample period is 
from 2006 to 2008.  Shares offered is the number of shares issued to the public by the issuers.  Net proceeds is the total amount 
excluding fees and expenses raised by the issuers.  Offer price is the issuing price of the IPO shares.  Low (High) file price is the lowest 
(highest) offer price.  Offer-to-Close return BSE (NSE) is the difference between the closing price and offer price as the percent of the 
offer price for IPOs listing on Bombay Stock Exchange (National Stock Exchange).  The number of underwriters includes lead and co-
lead manager in the IPO activity.  Age is the number of years from incorporating to listing year for IPO firms.  Sales, total assets, total 
liabilities, total debt, total equity, EBITDA, net income, operating cash flows, EPS, return on net worth and net assets value are based on 
the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO from the IPO prospectus.  Number of board of directors is the total number of 
directors, number of independent directors is the total independent or outside directors.  Busy chairman (managing director) is the 
multiple directorships possessed by chairman of the board (managing director).  Board age is the average age of the board of directors.  
Chairman (managing director) age is the age of chairman of the board and managing director.  Board shareholding pre-IPO is the number 
shares held by board of directors.  The corporate governance data are retrieved from the IPO prospectus.  The mean and median 
comparisons of ungraded and graded samples are based on the independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, respectively.  ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
 
 All Firms Ungraded Firms Graded Firms Difference 
 (N=177) (N=123) (N=54) (Ungraded – Graded) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-test Median 
Wilcoxon 
Signed- 
Rank test 
Panel A Offer Characteristics 
Shares Offered (million) 17.81 6.41 17.41 6.67 18.70 5.96 -1.29 -0.17 0.70 0.07
Net Proceeds ($million) 34.39 13.29 35.39 16.16 32.11 7.85 3.27 0.17 8.31*** 2.88
Offer Price 193.58 140.00 185.63 130.00 211.70 150.00 -26.08 -0.91 -20.00 -0.91
Low File Price 176.60 125.00 168.13 120.00 195.89 140.00 -27.76 -1.05 -20.00 -1.09
High File Price 199.55 145.00 191.49 130.00 217.93 155.00 -26.44 -0.88 -25.00 -1.04
Offer-to-Close Return BSE 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.56 0.03 0.42
Offer-to-Close Return NSE 0.23 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.14 1.53 0.10 1.13
Number of Underwriters 1.93 2.00 1.83 2.00 2.15 2.00 -0.32 -1.39 0.00 0.72
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Panel B Firm Characteristics 
Age 15.41 13.00 15.10 13.00 16.13 13.00 -1.03 -0.45 0.00 0.51
Sales ($million) 1,681.75 861.20 1,656.22 868.15 1,739.90 789.94 -83.68 -0.24 78.21 -0.39
Total Assets ($million) 2,082.75 895.90 2,130.19 886.51 1,974.70 973.12 155.49 0.34 -86.61 -0.20
Total Liabilities ($million) 1,291.77 489.50 1,343.77 496.13 1,173.31 463.81 170.46 0.53 32.32 0.87
Total Debt ($million) 792.17 283.34 837.72 312.79 688.42 250.75 149.30 0.78 62.04 0.91
Total Equity ($million) 1,018.77 433.30 933.98 420.55 1,211.91 444.80 -277.93 -1.07 -24.24 -0.74
EBITDA ($million) 259.82 148.82 262.55 146.79 253.49 148.82 9.06 0.17 -2.03 -0.08
Net Income ($million) 183.27 80.08 179.78 78.01 191.23 87.64 -11.44 -0.25 -9.63 -0.51
Operating Cash Flows 
($million) 49.07 25.16 72.39 29.99 -4.04 14.69 76.43* 1.68 15.30 1.34
EPS 10.70 7.34 10.27 7.10 11.68 8.99 -1.41 -0.87 -1.89 -0.84
Return on Net Worth 24.88 22.17 25.17 22.17 24.23 22.27 0.94 0.36 -0.09 -0.29
Net Assets Value ($million) 22.85 5.90 22.44 8.82 23.79 4.44 -1.34 -0.26 4.38 0.65
Panel C Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Number of Board of Directors 7.42 7.00 7.52 7.00 7.20 7.00 0.32 0.92 0.00 0.77
Number of Independent 
Directors 3.64 4.00 3.63 3.00 3.67 4.00 -0.03 -0.17 -1.00 -0.29
Busy Chairman 6.68 4.00 7.19 4.00 5.52 3.00 1.67 1.34 1.00 1.20
Busy Managing Director 5.19 3.00 5.44 3.00 4.61 3.00 0.83 0.85 0.00 0.99
Board Age 52.23 52.89 52.09 52.60 52.55 53.25 -0.46 -0.50 -0.65 -0.91
Chairman Age 56.11 56.00 56.02 56.00 56.30 59.00 -0.27 -0.14 -3.00 -0.57
Managing Director Age 48.23 48.00 48.06 48.00 48.61 48.50 -0.55 -0.32 -0.50 -0.47
Board Shareholdings Pre-IPO 
(%) 2.15 1.21 2.20 1.19 2.03 1.30 0.17 0.38 -0.11 -0.02
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Pre- and Post-Grading Period 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for pre and post IPO grading periods.  IPOs listed before (after) 2007, May 1 are classified as pre 
(post) grading period.  Offer-to-Close return BSE (NSE) is the difference between the closing price and offer price as the percent of the offer 
price for IPOs listing on Bombay Stock Exchange (National Stock Exchange).  Number of QIB application is the total number of qualified 
institutional application for IPO subcription (per IPO issue).  Number of retail application is the total number of retail application for IPO 
Subscription (per IPO issue).  QIB subscription is qualified institutional subscription as percentage of QIB shares offered.  Retail subscription 
is the retail subscription as percentage of retail shares offered.  Oversubscription is total number of shares subscribed divided by total shares 
offered.  Price to Sales is the offer price divided by sales per shares.  Price to Earnings is the offer price over earnings per shares.  Price to Book 
is the offer price divided by book value of equity.  Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from the market model 
based on 100-day post-IPO.  Amihud Illiquidity measure is computed 1/D*[|R|/(P*Vol)].  Panel B presents the variance tests for the qualified 
institutional, retail subscriptions and oversubscription.  Panel C reports the number of hot, warm and cold IPOs in pre- and post-grading period.  
Hot, warm, cold IPOs are defined as offer-to-close return BSE greater than 15%, 0<offer-to-close return BSE<=15% and offer-to-close<=0, 
respectively.  The comparison of means and medians for pre- vs post-grading periods are based on the independent t-test and Wilcoxon signed 
ranks tests.  For the variance test in Panel B, we compute the F-statistics.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
 Pre-Grading Post-Grading Difference 
 (N=89) (N=88) (Pre-Post) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Offer-to-Close Return BSE 0.150 0.013 0.602 0.314 0.150 0.625 -0.163* 
(-1.77) 
-0.137* 
(-1.93) 
Offer-to-Close Return NSE 0.155 0.018 0.547 0.303 0.153 0.618 -0.149 
(-1.59) 
-0.135 
(-1.42) 
Number of QIB Application 76.09 29.00 104.78 85.97 22.00 124.52 -9.872 
(-0.56) 
7.000 
(0.44) 
Number of Retail Application 91,844.95 37,535.00 138,029.98 146,870.03 37,516.00 313,693.90 -55,025.081 
(-1.50) 
19.000 
(0.48) 
QIB Subscription (times) 20.07 6.42 31.88 28.11 6.13 42.04 -8.039 
(-1.42) 
0.290 
(0.14) 
Retail Subscription (times) 9.17 4.98 12.00 12.62 4.25 20.19 -3.454 
(-1.37) 
0.732 
(0.66) 
Oversubscription (times) 15.76 5.58 20.89 23.56 5.83 33.48 -7.798* 
(-1.84) 
-0.244 
(-0.23) 
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Price to Sales 147.83 45.78 279.76 210.22 85.23 336.95 -62.397 
(-1.34) 
-39.445** 
(-2.31) 
Price to Earnings 28.64 13.62 34.78 28.12 13.52 33.32 0.514 
(0.10) 
0.109 
(0.72) 
Price to Book 85.58 42.92 109.03 125.31 67.52 142.60 -39.728** 
(-2.08) 
-24.596** 
(-2.23) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
0.140 0.117 0.095 0.184 0.161 0.120 -0.044*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.044*** 
(-2.63) 
Amihud Illiquidity 0.107x10-9 0.496x10-11 0.868x10-9 0.404x10-10 0.615x10-11 0.170x10-9 0.067 
(0.71) 
-0.119 
(-1.23) 
Panel B Test for Variance (F-statistic) – IPO Subscription Variables 
 F-statistic P-value       
Number of QIB Application    1.41 0.11       
Number of Retail Application    5.16*** 0.00       
QIB Subscription (times)    1.74** 0.01       
Retail Subscription (times)    2.83*** 0.00       
Oversubscription (times)    2.57*** 0.00       
Panel C  Number of Hot, Warm and Cold IPOs 
 
Pre-
Grading 
Post -
Grading       
Number of Hot IPOs   
(Offer-to-Close Return BSE>15%) 31 44       
Number of Warm IPOs  
(0<Offer-to-Close Return BSE<=15%) 16 12       
Number of Cold IPOs  
(Offer-to-Close Return BSE<=0%) 42 32       
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Table 4 Regression Results of Underpricing 
This table reports the regression results for the underpricing.  The dependent variable is the offer-to-close 
return BSE.  Models 1 to 4 are various models based on full sample during pre- and post-IPO grading 
mandatory.  For Model 5, if ungraded IPOs in the sample, grading takes value of 1.  For Model 6, if ungraded 
IPOs in the sample, grading takes value of 3.  For Model 7, Only graded IPOs are used in regression and 
continuous grading scale is used.  Grading (dummy) equals to 1 if the IPO is graded; otherwise zero.  Grading 
(continuous) is the actual grading ranging from 1 to 5 assigned by the grading agencies.  Group Affiliation is 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; otherwise zero.  Analyst Recommend is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is recommended as subscribed; otherwise (avoid) zero.  Offer 
price is the logarithm of IPO offering price.  Issue Size is the logarithm of number of shares offered.  
Subscription is the logarithm of total subscription, i.e. retail and institution.  RONW is the return on net worth 
prior to the IPO reported in the prospectus.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO collected from prospectus.  Age is 
the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of 
post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  Duality is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the chairman is the managing director; otherwise zero.  Independent Director is the number of the independent 
director divided by the total number of board of directors.  Busy Chairman is the logarithm of the number of 
other directorships that the chairman holds during IPO.  MD Salary is the logarithm of the monthly salary 
package of managing director.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, 
respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.249 3.195*** 1.927** 2.212*** 2.109** 2.214*** -2.923*** 
 (4.24) (3.69) (2.27) (2.67) (2.50) (2.77) (-2.95) 
Grading (dummy) -0.057 0.059 0.028 0.032    
 (-0.61) (0.80) (0.40) (0.48)    
Grading (continuous)     -0.005 -0.078 -0.047 
     (-0.15) (-0.83) (-0.79) 
Group Affiliation    -0.039 -0.044 -0.035 -0.408*** 
    (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.45) (-4.10) 
Analyst Recommend    0.159* 0.157* 0.165** -0.029 
    (1.93) (1.90) (2.03) (-0.34) 
Method  -0.002 0.156 0.144 0.140 0.150 0.108 
  (-0.01) (0.85) (0.77) (0.75) (0.80) (0.68) 
Offer Price  -0.278*** -0.180*** -0.210*** -0.204*** -0.200*** 0.261** 
  (-4.28) (-2.70) (-3.04) (-2.94) (-2.96) (2.42) 
Issue Size  -0.396*** -0.302*** -0.290*** -0.281*** -0.278*** 0.032 
  (-5.41) (-4.35) (-4.38) (-4.24) (-4.31) (0.51) 
Subscription  0.222*** 0.182*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.170*** -0.021 
  (6.17) (4.97) (4.72) (4.56) (4.76) (-0.52) 
RONW  -0.204 -0.091 -0.078 -0.083 -0.086 0.178 
  (-1.08) (-0.60) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.55) (1.53) 
Total Assets  0.033 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.026 0.025 
  (1.25) (1.28) (1.14) (1.08) (0.89) (1.05) 
Age  0.025 -0.008 -0.019 -0.020 -0.013 0.139** 
  (0.35) (-0.13) (-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.20) (1.98) 
Chg_Promoter Shares   -0.136 -0.132 -0.116 -0.085 -0.580 
   (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-1.44) 
Duality   -0.029 -0.033 -0.033 -0.032 0.048 
   (-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.43) (0.67) 
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Independent Director   -0.017 0.016 0.032 0.027 0.311 
   (-0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.092) (0.46) 
Busy Chairman   -0.015 -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 
   (-0.47) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.14) 
MD Salary   0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.090** 
   (0.45) (0.45) (0.56) (0.63) (2.50) 
F-statistic 0.32 7.83*** 3.44*** 3.21*** 3.20*** 3.27*** 2.52** 
Adj. R2 -0.004 0.249 0.182 0.188 0.188 0.192 0.357 
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Table 5 Regression Results of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table reports the regression results for the idiosyncratic volatility.  The dependent variable is the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the market model based on 100-day post-IPO.  Models 1 to 4 are 
various models based on full sample during pre- and post-IPO grading mandatory.  For Model 5, if 
ungraded IPOs in the sample, grading takes value of 1.  For Model 6, if ungraded IPOs in the sample, 
grading takes value of 3.  For Model 7, Only graded IPOs are used in regression and continuous grading 
scale is used.  Grading (dummy) equals to 1 if the IPO is graded; otherwise zero.  Grading (continuous) is 
the actual grading ranging from 1 to 5 assigned by the grading agencies.  Group Affiliation is dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; otherwise zero.  Analyst Recommend is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is recommended as subscribed; otherwise (avoid) zero.  Offer 
price is the logarithm of IPO offering price.  Offer price is the logarithm of IPO offering price.  
Chg_Promoter Shares is the ratio of post-IPO promoter shares and pre-IPO promoter shares.  RONW is the 
return on net worth prior to the IPO reported in the prospectus.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO collected 
from prospectus.  Debt-to-Equity is the ratio of total debt and total equity as reported in prospectus.  Age is 
the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  Duality is the dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the chairman is the managing director; otherwise zero.  Independent Director is the number 
of the independent director divided by the total number of board of directors.  Busy Chairman is the 
logarithm of the number of other directorships that the chairman holds during IPO.  MD Salary is the 
logarithm of the monthly salary package of managing director.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-
consistent. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 0.151*** 0.045 -0.060 -0.033 -0.068 -0.004 -0.363 
 (17.38) (0.50) (-0.53) (-0.27) (-0.57) (-0.03) (-0.94) 
Grading (dummy) 0.039* 0.033* 0.049** 0.052***    
 (1.92) (1.85) (2.49) (2.70)    
Grading (continuous)     0.015* -0.036* -0.032 
     (1.73) (-1.96) (-1.53) 
Group Affiliation    0.008 0.005 0.006 -0.013 
    (0.54) (0.30) (0.35) (-0.34) 
Analyst Recommend    0.016 0.011 0.018 0.044 
    (0.90) (0.60) (0.96) (1.01) 
Offer-to-Close Return  0.047*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.087** 
  (4.18) (4.47) (4.18) (3.98) (3.87) (2.28) 
Offer Price  0.047*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.015 
  (4.29) (5.48) (4.84) (4.90) (4.79) (0.30) 
Chg_Promoter Shares  0.062 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 0.021 0.116 
  (0.89) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.22) (0.28) (0.66) 
RONW  0.005 0.045 0.051 0.047 0.038 0.043 
  (0.17) (1.18) (1.29) (1.19) (0.91) (0.49) 
Total Assets  -0.008* -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.017 
  (-1.79) (-0.53) (-0.68) (-0.50) (-0.49) (0.57) 
Debt-to-Equity  -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.023 
  (-0.90) (-0.22) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.47) (-0.75) 
Age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.023 
  (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.36) (-0.43) (-0.07) (-0.74) 
Duality   -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 0.013 
   (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.81) (0.40) 
Independent Directors   0.077 0.084 0.090 0.103 0.750** 
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   (0.95) (1.04) (1.10) (1.25) (2.37) 
Busy Chairman   0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.008 
   (0.39) (0.32) (0.15) (0.11) (0.45) 
MD Salary   -0.005* -0.005* -0.005 -0.003 -0.018 
   (-1.80) (-1.75) (-1.58) (-1.20) (-0.85) 
F-statistic 4.75** 7.01*** 5.86*** 5.06*** 4.53*** 4.66*** 1.97* 
Adj. R2 0.021 0.224 0.288 0.283 0.256 0.263 0.248 
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Table 6 Regression Results of Retail and Institutional Subscriptions 
This table reports the regression results for the retail and institutional subscriptions.  The dependent variable in Panel A and B is the retail and institutional subscriptions, respectively.  
Models 1 to 4 are various models based on full sample during pre- and post-IPO grading mandatory.  For Model 5, if ungraded IPOs in the sample, grading takes value of 1.  For Model 
6, if ungraded IPOs in the sample, grading takes value of 3.  For Model 7, Only graded IPOs are used in regression and continuous grading scale is used.  Grading (dummy) equals to 1 if 
the IPO is graded; otherwise zero.  Grading (continuous) is the actual grading ranging from 1 to 5 assigned by the grading agencies.  Group Affiliation is dummy variable which equals to 
1 if the IPO is group affiliated; otherwise zero.  Analyst Recommend is the dummy variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is recommended as subscribed; otherwise (avoid) zero.  Offer 
price is the logarithm of IPO offering price.  Offer price is the logarithm of IPO offering price.  Method is the dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO method is fixed-price; otherwise 
zero.  RONW is the return on net worth prior to the IPO reported in the prospectus.  Total Assets is prior to the IPO collected from prospectus.  Debt-to-Equity is the ratio of total debt 
and total equity as reported in prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  Duality is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
chairman is the managing director; otherwise zero.  Independent Director is the number of the independent director divided by the total number of board of directors.  Busy Chairman is 
the logarithm of the number of other directorships that the chairman holds during IPO.  MD Salary is the logarithm of the monthly salary package of managing director.  *, **, and *** 
represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed significance level, respectively. The t-statistics in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
 
 Panel A: Retail Subscription Panel B: Institutional Subscription 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept 16.515*** 11.037*** 11.145*** 13.207*** 13.619*** 11.568*** 12.300** 17.324*** 0.603 2.405 4.345 4.854 2.599 4.444 
 (116.57) (5.94) (4.47) (6.00) (6.27) (5.25) (2.43) (84.33) (0.24) (0.77) (1.38) (1.44) (0.81) (0.69) 
Grading (dummy) -0.455* -0.397 -0.374     -0.916** -0.914*** -0.845** -0.751*    
 (-1.64) (-1.48) (-1.24)     (-2.38) (-2.69) (-2.14) (-1.86)    
Grading (continuous)    -0.295 0.081 0.834*** 0.975***     -0.093 1.109*** 1.036*** 
    (-0.96) (0.48) (3.05) (3.31)     (-0.39) (3.24) (3.53) 
Group Affiliation    -0.374 -0.335 -0.423* -0.228    -0.122 -0.061 -0.139 0.242 
    (-1.47) (-1.31) (-1.71) (-0.42)    (-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.45) (0.40) 
Analyst Recommend    0.978*** 1.014*** 0.852*** -0.638    0.991*** 1.061*** 0.887*** -1.234* 
    (3.69) (3.83) (3.28) (-0.89)    (3.30) (3.48) (2.89) (-1.83) 
Offer Price  -0.527*** -0.547*** -0.769*** -0.798*** -0.828*** 0.465  0.392** 0.420** 0.201 0.180 0.084 1.834*** 
  (-3.31) (-3.12) (-4.34) (-4.53) (-4.84) (1.11)  (2.03) (2.02) (0.96) (0.84) (0.41) (3.10) 
Method  0.045 0.090 0.010 0.070 -0.036 0.324  -0.875** -0.961* -1.002** -0.902* -1.034** -0.640 
  (0.13) (0.21) (0.03) (0.18) (-0.09) (0.38)  (-2.04) (-1.72) (-1.99) (-1.82) (-2.13) (-0.61) 
RONW  -0.456 -0.417 -0.338 -0.270 -0.228 -1.010  -0.830 -0.771 -0.611 -0.567 -0.346 -0.715 
  (-0.79) (-0.57) (-0.47) (-0.40) (-0.35) (-1.27)  (-1.12) (-0.84) (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.44) (-0.93) 
Total Assets  0.350*** 0.327*** 0.275*** 0.258*** 0.267*** -0.434*  0.724*** 0.649*** 0.590*** 0.570*** 0.562*** -0.374 
  (3.53) (2.81) (2.70) (2.59) (2.87) (-1.66)  (5.07) (4.08) (3.64) (3.35) (3.55) (-1.01) 
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Debt-to-Equity  -0.066 -0.058 -0.049 -0.043 -0.029 0.878***  -0.214* -0.237* -0.238* -0.232* -0.213 0.295 
  (-0.75) (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.41) (3.50)  (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.85) (-1.66) (-1.56) (1.05) 
Age  0.348 0.349 0.250 0.252 0.163 0.142  0.059 0.0973 0.017 0.040 -0.084 0.235 
  (1.51) (1.38) (0.97) (1.03) (0.71) (0.39)  (0.17) (0.25) (0.04) (0.10) (-0.25) (0.45) 
Duality   0.193 0.145 0.138 0.123 0.395   0.209 0.195 0.199 0.140 1.103* 
   (0.75) (0.59) (0.56) (0.52) (0.74)   (0.66) (0.64) (0.65) (0.48) (1.85) 
Independent Director   -0.043 0.169 -0.017 0.118 4.952   -1.521 -1.233 -1.454 -1.460 3.871 
   (-0.03) (0.14) (-0.01) (0.10) (1.22)   (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.80) (-0.81) (0.84) 
Busy Chairman   0.126 0.150 0.178 0.143 0.293   0.350* 0.367** 0.399** 0.406** 0.692*** 
   (0.84) (1.05) (1.28) (1.12) (1.64)   (1.86) (2.01) (2.19) (2.40) (3.11) 
MD Salary   0.016 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.319   -0.034 -0.037 -0.050 -0.060 0.314 
   (0.27) (0.23) (-0.02) (-0.03) (1.56)   (-0.52) (-0.63) (-0.85) (-1.20) (1.51) 
F-statistic 2.90* 5.79*** 2.98*** 3.82*** 3.74*** 4.79*** 1.99* 5.90** 13.39*** 7.12*** 7.01*** 6.44*** 7.78*** 4.64*** 
Adj. R2 0.011 0.168 0.131 0.203 0.198 0.255 0.239 0.030 0.360 0.331 0.365 0.342 0.393 0.548 
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Table 7 Firm and Issue Characteristics Across Different IPO Grades 
This table presents the means and medians of form and issue characteristics of graded IPOs.  54 IPOs are graded from 2007, May 1 to 2008, 
December 1.  Panel A reports the means and medians.  Panel B presents the number of firms based on 2 by 2 matrix between the actual grading 
scale and the pseudo grading computed using the form and issue characteristics.  P/E is price-to-earnings ratio.  P/S is price-to-sale ratio.  P/B is 
price-to-book ratio.  EV/EBITDA is the economic value-added divided by earnings before interests, taxes and depreciation and amortization.  
Total Assets is prior to the IPO collected from prospectus.  Age is the logarithm of number of years from incorporated year to IPO year.  D/E is 
debt-to-equity ratio.  EPS is earnings per share.  Promoter shares pre is the promoter shareholdings prior to IPO in percentage.  Promoter shares 
post is the promoter shareholdings post-IPO in percentage.  Group Affiliation is dummy variable which equals to 1 if the IPO is group affiliated; 
otherwise zero.  Number of Directors is the total number of board of directors during IPO.  Independent Directors is the number of 
independent/outside directors.  MD Salary is the logarithm of the monthly salary package of managing director.  
 
Panel A Mean and Median of Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 Grading Scale 
 1 2 3 4 
 (N=7) (N=14) (N=24) (N=9) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
P/E 17.095 11.321 12.723 9.918 33.975 13.867 50.159 31.015
P/S 80.261 85.498 50.526 42.402 215.474 89.316 726.849 649.453
P/B 62.563 57.567 59.225 53.464 116.598 73.593 282.603 322.702
EV/EBITDA 8.461 7.187 5.719 5.120 6.470 4.318 98.529 4.569
Total Assets ($Million) 19.944 20.071 20.066 20.147 21.354 20.985 21.284 21.553
Age 9.429 10.000 12.786 11.500 17.625 14.500 22.556 13.000
D/E 0.758 0.504 1.019 0.872 1.418 1.222 0.430 0.353
EPS 9.470 5.245 13.364 8.055 12.163 9.815 14.584 13.110
Promoter Shares Pre (%) 78.883 77.580 85.532 89.220 78.113 81.535 84.366 87.900
Promoter Shares Post (%) 50.080 52.110 56.250 58.260 57.300 54.815 69.028 74.400
Group Affiliation 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.222 0.000
Number of Directors 5.857 5.000 6.857 6.000 7.458 7.500 8.111 8.000
Independent Directors 2.857 3.000 3.857 4.000 3.542 4.000 4.333 4.000
MD Salary 140,714.29 60,000.00 165,785.71 112,500.00 447,030.54 200,000.00 455,198.11 233,400.00
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Panel B Pseudo Grading (number of firms) 
 Actual Grade     
Pseudo Grade 1 2 3 4 %  error    
1 2 2 2 1 71.43    
2 3 5 4 2 64.29    
3 0 7 13 4 45.83    
4 0 1 4 4 55.56    
 
